Mechanical Philosophy: Reductionism and Foundationalism by Tho, Tzuchien
MMechanical Philosophy:
Reductionism and
Foundationalism
Tzuchien Tho
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol,
Bristol, UK
Related Topics
Mechanical philosophy · Reductionism ·
Foundationalism · Demonstrative knowledge ·
Atomism · Experimental philosophy ·
Rationalism · Empiricism · Scepticism
(Skepticism) · Laws of motion
Introduction
Reductionism, the mode of natural explanation
which reduces complex phenomena (including
mental phenomena) to simple and epistemically
or ontological brute entities or sensibles, is not an
exclusively modern trend. All pre-Socratic philos-
ophers are known through their various proposals
for a reductionist ontology (i.e., water, indivisi-
bles, four fundamental elements, etc.). Reduction-
ism in modern philosophy is often understood as
the sine qua non of mechanical philosophy.
Among the various sects of this general theoreti-
cal tendency in the early modern period however,
to what a reductionism would reduce was a matter
of much debate. Yet some of the common moti-
vation among these tendencies can be identified
with the overall rejection of causes in nature other
than material and efficient causes. Hence reduc-
tionism should be understood as a strategy of
explanation rather than necessitating particular
ontological commitments.
While reduction to a brute entity or a series of
fundamental elements can be traced back to the
pre-Socratics, foundationalism, as we understand
it, is more exclusively associated with the emer-
gence of modern philosophy. While reductionism
is ancient, foundationalism, on the other hand, is
more exclusively associated with the emergence
of modern philosophy. Although the term is not an
actor’s category, thinkers such as Descartes
sought to overcome the threat of (self-imposed)
hyperbolic skepticism through the establishment
of foundational knowledge. However, earlier
theories of knowledge such as what we find in
the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition could also be
called “foundationalist” in the sense that it sets up
a hierarchy for the degrees of knowledge, where
we move from less certain ways of knowing and
move “up” to apodictic knowledge
(demonstrative) which achieves the highest and
most certain form. We find in early modern
foundationalist thinking, borrowing from the
image of Euclidian demonstration, an inverted
hierarchy that moves from the ground of a small
number of certain knowledge to more complex
forms. The key difference here is that Aristotelian
knowledge works “up” toward certainty where
Cartesianism is grounded “down” in certainty.
Of course, Descartes and Aristotle share a
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common recognition of geometrical demonstra-
tion as apodictic. However, Descartes grounds
knowledge on the clearness and distinctness of
ideas, of which geometrical certainty is a paradig-
matic case. Hence complex forms of knowledge
are certain if they are rooted in the solid founda-
tion of fundamental axiom-like clear and distinct
ideas. Hence, while reductionism was a strategy
of explanation, foundationalism was a method of
knowledge.
This entry will address the unique confluence
of reductionism and foundationalism in the
mechanical philosophy of the early modern
period. The result of this confluence of a mode
of explanation with a method of knowledge is that
only reduction to mechanical principles consti-
tutes well-founded knowledge. However some
thinkers within the tradition also sought to undo
the restrictive implications of this confluence
without rejecting the first fruits of the mechanistic
program.
The Internal Problems of Reductionist
Explanation in Mechanical Philosophy
We have indicated above that reductionism and
foundationalism are different aspects at work in
early modern natural philosophy. In the case of
Descartes, these are distinct but mutually
supporting projects: the reduction of the natural
world to its ontological basis in extended sub-
stance (res extensa) is in deep sympathy with the
foundation of knowledge in clear and distinct
ideas. Since geometry is a priori and based on
clear and distinct ideas, the reduction of physical
reality to instantiated geometrical relations allows
for a convenient convergence of reductionism and
foundationalist epistemology. Though Cartesian
matter (res extensa) is inert, the laws of material
interactions and transformation are sustained by
God’s decree, concurrence, and conservation
(AT VIII, 61; CSM I, 240; Arthur 2007). The
official view here is that there is simply nothing
other than geometrical truths to be known about
the nature of extended beings. (This is compli-
cated by the ambiguous account of the laws of
nature in the Principia Philosophiaewhich appear
to provide conditions beyond mere geometrical
relationships.) However, for a broad number of
key mechanists like Gassendi and Boyle, this
convergence does not follow. For a standard set
of canonical thinkers in the tradition, it is ontolog-
ical reductionism rather than epistemic
foundationalism that most characterizes this pro-
ject of mechanical philosophy.
The standard identification of mechanical phi-
losophy with materialism and atomism
(understood by some scholars as one and the
same for the pre-modern and early modern period)
is not entirely mistaken. The term “mechanical
philosophy” was first used by H. More and
R. Boyle (Hattab 2011; Anstey 2000). While
Boyle did not make any ultimate commitment to
indivisibles, the project of “mechanical or corpus-
cular philosophy” was rooted in the use of atom-
istic hypotheses as a means of designating the
proper domain of natural explanation even when
the authors were not fully committed to indivisi-
bles (Pyle 1995; Boyle 1999, I, 474). (The relation
between a hypothetical commitment to atomism
and the legitimacy of mechanical philosophy in
Boyle has been litigated between A. Pyle,
A. Clericuzio, P. Anstey, and A. Chalmers in a
series of corresponding articles. See Anstey 2002;
Chalmers 2002; Clericuzio 1990, 2000; Pyle
2002, 2018.) However, if we expand the term
“mechanical philosophy” to a wider set of figures
to include the Italian contingent featuring
Guidobaldo del Monte, Galileo, and the Galilean
school, the atomistic doctrine cannot be consid-
ered a necessary aspect of the reductionist posi-
tion (Garber 2002). “Mechanics” in this tradition
prescribes a form of explanation that reduces to
the five (or six) classical machines (Guidobaldo
1577, cited in Garber 2002).
Understanding God as the divine artificer of a
complex machine (the world) was not uncommon
for all sects of the mechanical tradition. However,
this view does not have to imply anything about
the ultimate constituents of reality. (The term
“mechanistic philosophy” may now seem a bit
nominalistic between those who self-professed
and those whom later historians called “mecha-
nistic.” We make the distinction while tarrying
with the ambiguity. See Boudri 2002.) Insofar as
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reductionist explanation does not have to commit
to entities at the irreducible level of reality, the
reduction to mechanical aggregates can serve as
the models for the explanation of phenomena.
Nonetheless, this view does incur the ultimate
theoretical burden of implying that motion must
be an extramundane input to nature. Like any
machine, what is arranged is bodies. This does
not imply that the machine is operative through
some internal principle as atomists like Gassendi
held or according to the Leibnizian theory of
immanent “living force.” The Aristotelian tradi-
tion affirmed natural motions and places due to
causes (final and formal) that mechanists saw as
occult and illegitimate. The actuality of an imma-
nent principle of motion in nature remained a
debate in this domain well into the eighteenth
century. The use of reductionistic mechanism in
the life sciences where immanent organic growth
(the preeminent form of Aristotelian motion) was
seemingly irreducible also remained an abiding
difficulty (Des Chene 2001; Hutchins 2015;
Baldassarri 2019). Nonetheless Descartes’ affir-
mation of reductionism and foundationalism was
consistent on this account. Matter was inert and
motion only exists through an external mover
(God).
Hencewhile materialism and corpuscularianism
can be legitimately understood as a key doctrine
among the mechanical philosophers, it is not a
necessary feature of this approach to explanation
(Dijksterhuis 1969). Reductionism does not have
to be either complete or go “all the way” to the
ultimate metaphysical constituents of reality but
only to the functional aspects of nature, analogous
to machines of art, responsible for its basic
operation.
For the atomists among the mechanistic philos-
ophers, reductionist explanation was a reduction to
atoms or corpuscles. This view constitutes a main-
stream of mechanistic philosophy that reduces
physical explanation to fundamental entities. In
its most fundamental aspect, the spatiality of bodies
is accounted for by the spatiality of their funda-
mental constituents. This aspect is continuous with
historical atomism from classical sources. How-
ever, the explanation of physical properties
requires further properties of observable
phenomena outside of spatial ones. While matters
like spatial position and locomotion (change in
place) can be geometrically explained through fun-
damental constituents or parts mechanically
arranged, properties like heat, color, and even
weight (or mass) require further elaboration. This
was a problem with little straightforward agree-
ment among the mechanical philosophers.
Prominent atomists like Gassendi and Boyle,
though differing in their commitment to the view,
did appeal to features of atoms that should be
understood as qualities or principles independent
of their indivisibility. Most intuitively, color is
interpreted as a sensory effect of the texture of
indivisibles. More problematically, the property
of heat was speculated to be reducible to the
“calorific” or “frigorific” atoms which may reside
in particular bodies (Gassendi 1658, I, 394–401;
Boyle 1999, IV, 380–381). (As ever, Boyle is
skeptical of this possibility but seriously main-
tains the hypothesis for experimental purposes.
See Pyle 2018.) The danger here is that this view
reintroduces the Aristotelian appeal to principles
and essences that the reduction to atoms was
supposed to avoid. Of course we cannot expect
historical authors to have “purified” their writing
to the retrospective standards of the historian of
thought. This issue however does identify a recur-
ring problem of this atomistic version of mechan-
ical reductionism. With generosity, Boyle does
provide a suitable answer to this question by
distinguishing between the universal matter of
atoms and their transmutation into various
forms. Appealing to the tradition of alchemy, he
argues that orderly transmutations of “one com-
mon matter” can give rise to the variation of
principles inherent in bodies as composites
(Boyle 1999, III, 13). This view is not entirely
free from the elemental principles of Aristotelian-
ism but does provide enough to justify the plausi-
bility of universal reduction.
The irreducibility of qualitative principles
among the atomists has a counterpart among the
nonatomists. Thinkers like Descartes and Hobbes
held a sister concept to atomism. With self-
described corpuscularianism, they rejected the
explicit doctrines of atomism and traditional
accounts of the void and the indivisible entity.
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From them, nature was reducible to explanations
based on size, shape, and motion. However, this
reduction did not require the further ontological
basis to ultimate indivisibles. In relation to the
former problem, Descartes was explicitly clear
that qualitative properties like heat and moisture
were due only to the motion of bodies (AT XI,
25–26, CSM I 89; AT XI 33, CSM 191). This
reliance on a minimalist ontology also involved
some gaps of explanation. What was lacking, as
the later Leibniz and Newton would point out, is
the principle of resistance in the interaction
between bodies. In the case of Descartes and
Hobbes, the reduction of physical phenomena to
size, shape, and motion implies that the phenom-
enon of resistance and elasticity of bodies can
only be accounted for by externally imposed prin-
ciples of interaction (such as the laws of collision
in Principia Philosophiae and its similar but alter-
native version in De Corpore). Hence while Des-
cartes and Hobbes explicitly disagreed on the laws
of motion (and its definition), they agreed on the
rejection of any inherent property in matter irre-
ducible to external spatial relations (i.e., geomet-
rical properties). Resistance and elasticity do not
emerge from the inherent properties of bodies
themselves. This provided much fodder for later
physical theorists of collision (Murray et al.
2011). (Later critics of Descartes on elasticity
include C. Huygens, G.W. Leibniz, I. Newton,
E. du Cha^telet, etc.) Descartes’ fundamental errors
in his laws of collision provide the occasion for
the disputation of whether an internal force of
resistance (a proto-inertia concept) was necessary
for physics (Gabbey 1971; Bernstein 1981). How-
ever, the empirical errors of Descartes’ laws were
not logically due to the reductionistic view itself.
Certainly, a more accurate account of inertial force
could have been defended without the adoption of
the metaphysics of “inherence” (e.g., the modern
theory of inertial mass). Nonetheless, later
thinkers such as Leibniz and Newton argued that
some internal force of resistance (vis insita) or
elasticity must be understood as a key participant
in physical phenomena such as collision and (for
Newton) attraction.
The Synthesis of Reductionism and
Foundationalism
As we have identified above, many modern natu-
ral philosophers embraced reductionism as the
legitimate means to provide explanation for phys-
ical phenomena. By appealing to earlier tradi-
tions, atomists sought to reduce natural
explanation to the properties and behavior of indi-
visibles. Nonatomists sought to reduce natural
explanation to the size, shape, and motion of
bodies whether these reduce to indivisibles,
some other kind of thing, or whether they reduce
at all. As we have seen, a reductionist approach to
explanation does not have to go “all the way” to
primary constituents. Appealing to Guidobaldo
Del Monte, the reduction to composed machines
may be a more sensible way to identify what was
so “mechanical” about the so-called mechanists
(Guidobaldo 1577). This characterization opens
up an important question. If the nonatomists did
not appeal to the fundamental entity, what grants
the certainty of reduction? In thinkers like Des-
cartes, the reductionist strategy was the conse-
quence of a foundationalist theory of ideas. We
shall examine this point here.
Among the mechanical philosophers, we find
two main themes in the theory of ideas (or theory
of knowledge). The first is the Baconian-inspired
experimental method based on induction and the
dynamic fallibilist interplay of empirical observa-
tion and rational taxonomy. The second is the
Cartesian method, often called “rationalist,” that
roots knowledge on the a priori clearness and
distinctness of ideas. Of course these two tradi-
tions are not exclusive; Descartes himself claims a
debt to Bacon as do other canonical “rationalists”
such as Leibniz. Conversely the Lockean program
of the theory of ideas is also deeply
foundationalist insofar as it is rooted in the basis
of sense certainty eschewing the a priori basis of
clearness and distinctness. Nonetheless, as we
move to the later part of the modern period,
these two traditions move further apart. In
Leibniz’s polemical disputation of Locke’s An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, we
see the maturation of one corner of this debate
regarding the plausibility of “innate ideas,” a
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parting of ways that becomes rigid by the time of
Wolff and Kant. Nonetheless, it is important to
highlight the variation in the bottom-up
foundationalism that characterizes modern
philosophy.
For the Descartes of the Meditations, the irre-
ducibility of mind to matter grants matter a clear
and distinct nature as res extensa. The reduction of
physical qualities to the clear and distinct res
extensa, without any further commitment to
atoms or other substantial qualities, is grounded
in this epistemic criterion. In the Principia
Philosophiae, Descartes provides a more positive
account of the substantial nature of res extensa.
Although the logical development of the text
implies that neither mind nor matter could stand
independently of the divine, material substance is
identifiable as a kind of instantiated geometry,
determined only by spatial qualities. Further prop-
erties of impenetrability, surface properties, elas-
ticity, and the like are relegated to modal
secondary features emergent from size, shape,
and motion. From this position, we can see that
reductionism is implied in Descartes’ theory of
ideas (the criterion of certainty) rather than having
an independent motivation.
It could be conversely argued that
foundationalism does not have to include any
reduction. This is most apparent in the later tran-
scendental philosophers of the German tradition.
However we can already see this view at work in
Locke. Locke’s writings are shot through with
Baconian experimentalism. Yet, with explicit Car-
tesian inspiration, Locke’s epistemology was sys-
tematically empiricist (a rejection of innate ideas),
based on simple and complex ideas produced in
the mind by sensory experience. The system is
complex but well-known. For Locke, the founda-
tion of knowledge on the certainty of simple ideas
does not have to imply either atomism or any
other ontological reduction (Locke Essay IV, 3,
11). The program of ontological reduction in nat-
ural explanation is entertained by Locke but not
necessitated by the foundational chain of mental
association that connects simple to complex ideas.
Explanation is, in the tradition of Locke, episte-
mic in character and, hence, in line with the
fallibilist experimentalist tradition. Hence even
as Locke distinguishes primary and secondary
qualities in perception (the epistemic chain), the
real essences of things are, as a practical matter,
ultimately inaccessible (Locke Essay III, 6, 2).
The Independence of Reductionism and
Foundationalism
In the work of Leibniz, we find another kind of
response to this issue of reductionism,
foundationalism, and their relation. The most
important thing to highlight here is the
relativization of levels of explanation that we
find in his work. In the strict interpretation of
mechanical philosophy, a physical phenomenon
has to be merely reduced to its functional parts
interpreted “mechanically” rather than ultimately.
(Needless to say, the adult Leibniz never adopted
atomism even though he claims to have been an
adherent in his early youth. GP III 620.) The
natural philosophy of Leibniz follows in this tra-
dition, affirming broadly materialistic explana-
tions based solely on aggregated bodies and
efficient causality (Leibniz, Specimen
Dynamicum, GM IV, 234–253, AG 117–138).
However, Leibniz also affirmed that these
accounts are embedded in a broader family of
causal relations, including teleological causation
that was eschewed by his contemporaries. His
famous assertion that it is living force (measured
by mv^2) that is universally conserved in nature
(instead of merely the conservation of the quantity
of motion mv) is based on what he argued to be
“perceptible by the mind alone” beyond mere
empirical observation or reduction to external
geometrical relations (GM VI 241, AG 125).
The contemporary reader may rightfully wonder
why the conservation of energy (for which living
force qua mv^2 is an archaic form) could be
understood as metaphysically beyond other fea-
tures of observable physical properties. There are
many subtleties here, but Leibniz interprets living
force, within the framework of seventeenth-
century physics, as incompatible with any theory
rooted in the inertness of extended substance.
Hence Leibniz accepts the rational legitimacy of
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explanation through reduction but rejects its
fundamentality.
Leibniz introduces a relativization of explana-
tory frameworks. On one hand, material entities
and efficient causation are sufficient to provide a
mathematical account of corporeal motion. On
another hand, the theory of living forces provides
an additional layer by identifying the conserved
quantity in corporeal motion. This additional
aspect, for Leibniz, indicates not only that there
is an inherent aspect of physical bodies
unrecognized by the reductive mechanistic
account but also that efficient causality is insuffi-
cient to capture the completeness of the causes
pertinent to locomotion.
Like Locke, Leibniz’s physical theory presents
a foundationalism without reductionism. They are
sympathetic in the project of foundational knowl-
edge of nature while relativizing
(or instrumentalizing) the entity for which this
foundation relies. While Locke hypothesizes
atomism but is uncommitted to it, Leibniz rejects
atomism on the basis of sufficient reason (G VII
378, AG 332). The result here is that the conflu-
ence of reduction and foundation in mechanistic
philosophy also gave rise to a theoretical indepen-
dence between the reductionist project and the
foundationalist one in the late seventeenth
century.
Cross-References
▶Boyle’s Mechanical Philosophy
▶Corpuscularianism
▶Descartes
▶Descartes’ Mechanical Philosophy
▶Gassendi, Pierre
▶Gravity as a Property of Matter
▶Hobbes on First Philosophy and Natural
Philosophy
▶Huygens, Christiaan
▶Life, Mechanization of
▶Light, Mechanization of
▶Locke and Mechanism
▶Magnetism (Mechanical)
▶Mechanical Philosophies
▶Mechanical Philosophy: an Introduction
▶Mechanical Philosophy: Mechanics
▶Mechanical Work
▶Mechanism and Chemistry in Early Modern
Natural Philosophy
▶Mechanism: 18th-Century German Philosophy
▶Newton and Leibniz
References
Anstey P (2000) The philosophy of Robert Boyle.
Routledge, London/New York
Anstey P (2002) Robert Boyle and the heuristic value of
mechanism. Stud Hist Phil Sci 33:161–174
Arthur R (2007) Beeckman, Descartes and the force of
motion. J Hist Philos 45(1):1–28
Baldassarri F (2019) The mechanical life of plants: Des-
cartes on botany. Br J Hist Sci 52(1):41–63. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S000708741800095X
Bernstein H (1981) Passivity and inertia in Leibniz’s
dynamics. Studia Leibnitiana 13:97–113
Boudri JC (2002) What was mechanical about mechanics:
the concept of force between metaphysics and mechan-
ics from Newton to Lagrange. Springer, Dordrecht
Boyle R (1999-2000) In: Hunter MCW, Davis EB (eds)
The works of Robert Boyle, vol 14. Pickering &
Chatto, London
Chalmers A (2002) Experiment versus mechanical philos-
ophy in the work of Robert Boyle: a reply to Anstey and
Pyle. Stud Hist Philos Sci 33:187–193
Clericuzio A (1990) A redefinition of Boyle’s chemistry
and corpuscular philosophy. Ann Sci 47:561–589
Clericuzio A (2000) Elements, principles and corpuscles: a
study of atomism and chemistry in the seventeenth
century. Kluwer, Dordrecht
Del Guidobaldo M (1577) Mechanicorum liber. Apud
Hieronymum Concordiam, Pisa
Des Chene D (2001) Spirits and clocks. Machine and
organism in Descartes. Cornell University Press,
Cornell
Descartes R (1984, 1985, 1991) The philosophical writings
of Descartes. 3 Volumes. Cottingham J, Stoothoff R,
Murdoch D (trans.), and v. III, Cottingham J,
Stoothoff R, Murdoch D, Kenny A (trans). Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (Cited by the abbreviation
CSM or CSMK then volume number and page number)
Descartes R (1996) Œuvres de Descartes. 11 Volumes.
Adam Ch, Tannery P (eds). J. Vrin, Paris (Cited by
the abbreviation AT then volume number and page
number)
Dijksterhius EJ (1969) The mechanization of the world
picture. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gabbey A (1971) Force and inertia in seventeenth-century
dynamics. Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 2(1):1–67
Garber D (2002) Descartes, mechanics, and the mechanical
philosophy. Midwest Stud Philos 26(1):185–204
6 Mechanical Philosophy: Reductionism and Foundationalism
Gassendi P (1658) Petri Gassendi Opera Omnia. 6 Vols.
Sumptibus Laurentii Anisson, & Ioan. Bapt. Devenet,
Lyon
Hattab H (2011) The mechanical philosophy. In: Clarke
DM, Wilson C (eds) The Oxford handbook of philoso-
phy in early modern Europe. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp 71–95. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199556137.003.0005
Hutchins BR (2015) Descartes, corpuscles and reduction-
ism: mechanism and Systems in Descartes’ physiology.
Philos Q 65(261):669–689
Murray G, Harper W, Wilson C (2011) Huygens, wren,
Wallis, and Newton on rules of impact and reflection.
In: Jalobeanu D, Anstey PR (eds) Vanishing matter and
the Laws of motion. Routledge, NewYork, pp 153–191
Pyle A (1995) Atomism and its critics: from Democritus to
Newton. Thoemmes Press, Bristol
Pyle A (2002) Boyle on science and the mechanical phi-
losophy: a reply to Chalmers. Stud Hist Phil Sci
33:175–190
Pyle A (2018) The theory of matter. In: Kaufman
D (ed) The Routledge companion to seventeenth cen-
tury philosophy. Routledge, London/New York,
pp 410–446
Mechanical Philosophy: Reductionism and Foundationalism 7
